We study the impact of exposing hospitals in a National Health Service (NHS) to non-price competition by exploiting a patient choice reform in Norway in 2001. The reform facilitates a di¤erence-in-di¤erence research design due to geographical variation in the scope for competition. Using rich administrative data covering the universe of NHS hospital admissions from 1998 to 2005, we …nd that hospitals in more competitive areas have a sharper reduction in AMI mortality, readmissions, and length of stay than hospitals in less competitive areas. These results indicate that competition improves patient health outcomes and hospital cost e¢ ciency, even in the Norwegian NHS with large distances, low …xed treatment prices, and mainly public hospitals.
Introduction
Health care is one of the most important sectors in the economy. OECD countries spend on average 9 percent of their GDP on health care (OECD, 2017) . Health care is also crucial for individuals' well-being and the health status of the population more broadly. The organisation of health care provision is therefore of great importance.
The health care sector has traditionally been, and still is, extensively regulated in many countries, implying limited, or in some countries even no use of market mechanisms. 1 This has particularly been the case in countries with a National Health Service (NHS), such as the UK, the Scandinavian countries, and the Southern European countries. In the last decades, however, many countries, including countries with an NHS, have introduced market-oriented reforms introducing provider competition in the delivery of health care.
Despite the extensive adoption of market-oriented reforms across countries, there is still lack of strong evidence on the impact of introducing competition in the provision of health care, especially from outside the US and England. 2 Most of the existing studies, which are based on the US Medicare programme, exploit cross-sectional variation in market structure to identify the impact of competition. A potential problem with this approach is that market structure is not exogenous, but possibly a¤ected by hospital performance along dimensions such as quality of care. 3 To address this issue, we follow the approach proposed by Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013) , who study the impact of hospital competition by exploiting an exogenous policy reform introducing patient choice in the English NHS in 2006. While the reform applied to all NHS hospitals at the same time, geographical variation in market structure prior to the reform facilitates a di¤erence-in-di¤erence (DiD) research design. In Norway there was a similar reform in 2001, where the government introduced nationwide patient choice within the Norwegian NHS, replacing an administrative system where patients were referred to the closest hospital o¤ering the relevant treatment within their county of residence. The new policy therefore implied a switch from a situation where the NHS hospitals were local monopolists in their catchment area to a scheme with potential for non-price competition among NHS hospitals.
While the policy reforms introducing patient choice in the English and the Norwegian NHS are 1 There are notable exceptions, such as the US where market mechanisms for the delivery of health care have been in place for a long time. 2 See Gaynor and Town (2011) for an extensive overview of the literature on competition in health care markets. 3 High-quality hospitals are likely to have a larger market share (more patients) than low-quality hospitals. The presence of a high-quality hospital may also deter entry of new hospitals into the market.
fairly similar, there are also important di¤erences across the two NHS systems. First, England had a gradual roll-out of their …xed price (Payment by Result) funding scheme in the period prior to the reform, with the full scale implementation of this scheme coinciding with the patient choice reform. 4 In Norway, however, a …xed price payment scheme based on diagnosis related groups (DRG) was in place since 1997 and did not change before (or after) the policy reform. Second, while England implemented a pure …xed price scheme, Norway had a mixed payment scheme which was partly based on …xed prices and partly on block grants. The …xed price component accounted for about 40-60% of hospital revenues, with the remaining being covered by the block grant. An important implication of this is that Norwegian NHS hospitals were facing much lower …xed treatment prices than their English counterparts, potentially reducing their incentives to compete. Third, whereas NHS hospitals in England are organised as free-standing trusts (mostly as Foundation Trusts with discretion to retain and utilise …nancial surpluses), the Norwegian NHS hospital market is composed of both public and private (non-pro…t) hospitals, with the former constituting the vast majority (around 90 percent). Finally, a quick glance at the map reveals that travel distances are substantially larger in Norway than in England, which potentially implies lower competitive pressures for Norwegian hospitals. The contribution of our study is therefore to provide more evidence on the causal e¤ects of hospital competition from outside the US and England, in a setting where relevant institutional di¤erences are potentially important, thus contributing to the external validity of the …ndings in the existing literature.
In order to do so, we have assembled a rich dataset based on detailed administrative data covering the universe of hospital admissions in the Norwegian NHS over eight years from 1998 to 2005 . For the analysis, the data are aggregated to quarterly observations at hospital and DRG level.
We use a similar DiD research design as Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013) , where the post-reform period is interacted with a treatment (competition) intensity variable speci…c for each hospital. This implies that the impact of hospital competition is identi…ed by comparing the di¤erential e¤ects between hospitals in less competitive areas with hospitals in more competitive areas before and after the reform. Treatment (competition) intensity is captured by a HirschmanHer…ndahl Index (HHI) for each hospital based on predicted patient ‡ows prior to the reform to account for endogenous market structure, as in Gaynor et al. (2013) . 5 The e¤ects of exposing the NHS hospitals to competition are estimated controlling for time trends, patient case mix (age, gender, comorbidities) at hospital and DRG level, and hospital and DRG …xed e¤ects.
Based on the DiD approach, we obtain the following results. First, we …nd that the introduction of (non-price) competition in the Norwegian NHS, induced by the patient choice reform, is associated with a sharper decline in acute myocardial infarction (AMI) mortality rates for hospitals in more competitive (less concentrated) areas compared to hospitals in less competitive (more concentrated) areas. A 10 percent reduction in the average HHI leads to a 2.8 percent (or 0.4 percentage point) fall in the AMI mortality rate. The point estimates of the e¤ect of competition on stroke and overall hospital mortality have the same sign as the e¤ect on AMI mortality, but these estimates are not statistically signi…cant. These pro-competitive …ndings on hospital quality are similar, also in terms of magnitude, to the …ndings by Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013) from the English NHS. This is perhaps surprising, given that the Norwegian health care system is characterised by lower …xed (DRG) prices due to partial block grant funding, publicly owned hospitals (which might imply less pro…t orientation) and generally longer travel distances, which in sum suggest a smaller scope for competition.
Second, we …nd that the introduction of competition in the Norwegian NHS is associated with a sharper reduction in (elective and emergency) readmission rates for hospitals in more competitive areas compared to hospitals in less competitive areas after the reform. A readmission usually re ‡ects that the …rst treatment was associated with complications, implying that lower readmission rates signal higher hospital quality. Thus, this …nding supports the pro-competitive results for AMI mortality. Although the patient choice reform only applied to elective treatments, the e¤ect on readmission rates is even stronger for emergency treatments, which suggests a positive spillover e¤ect on emergency treatments of exposing NHS hospitals to competition. As the results for elective readmissions may potentially be biased due to changes in patient ‡ows induced by the patient choice reform, it is reassuring that the e¤ects for emergency treatments are qualitatively Third, we …nd that the patient choice reform induced a sharper decline in length of stay at NHS hospitals in more competitive areas compared to NHS hospitals in less competitive areas, indicating a pro-competitive e¤ect on hospital cost e¢ ciency. As for readmissions, the e¤ects are statistically signi…cant for both elective and emergency treatments, suggesting a positive spillover e¤ect of the patient choice reform on emergency treatments. We also …nd some evidence of di¤erential ownership e¤ects of competition, where the e¤ect of competition on cost e¢ ciency tends to be signi…cantly stronger for private (non-pro…t) hospitals than for the public hospitals. It must be stressed, though, that these results are based on the observed responses of only six private hospitals, and should therefore be interpreted with some caution. Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al.
(2013) …nd similar e¤ects on length of stay, but do not investigate possible di¤erential e¤ects of ownership or for elective vs. emergency treatments. We rationalise the above described …ndings in a theoretical analysis, showing that the e¤ects of (non-price) competition, induced by patient choice, on hospital quality and cost e¢ ciency depend on hospitals'pro…t orientation and price-cost margins. In particular, if hospitals are pro…t oriented and face positive price-cost margins, competition will improve both hospital quality and cost e¢ ciency.
However, if hospitals are less pro…t oriented (more altruistic) and face negative price-cost margins, then competition has in general ambiguous e¤ects on hospital quality and cost e¢ ciency. Since hospitals in the Norwegian NHS are mainly public and the …xed (DRG) prices are low due to a mixed funding scheme, it is far from obvious that the introduction of competition would have positive quality and cost e¢ ciency e¤ects. However, our empirical analysis identi…es, as in the English NHS, pro-competitive e¤ects of the patient choice reform.
In summary, our study provides evidence that exposing NHS hospitals to non-price competition saves lives, reduces complications, and shortens hospital stays, which suggests that competition improves patient welfare and possibly also total welfare. In order to illustrate the magnitudes of these e¤ects, consider as a simple example an increase in the number of competing hospitals from two to three, which -assuming symmetry -reduces the HHI by 33 percent. At the sample means, this increase in competition implies that one life is saved per 77 AMI admissions, that there is one less readmission per 23 (150) emergency (elective) admissions, and that one in every 14 (4) emergency (elective) patients is discharged from hospital one day earlier.
In qualitative terms, our …ndings are consistent with evidence from the English NHS provided by Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013) , but also with several US studies focusing on the provision of hospital care to Medicare patients where prices are also …xed, e.g., Kessler and McClellan (2000) . Our study of the Norwegian NHS therefore extends the robustness and thus the external validity of the positive e¤ects of exposing hospitals to non-price competition in an institutional setting where hospitals'incentives to compete appear to be relatively weak.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we explain in more detail the relation of our study to existing literature. In Section 3 we present a general theoretical framework to study how hospital competition is likely to a¤ect quality provision and cost e¢ ciency. In Section 4 we explain the institutional setting and the policy reforms of the Norwegian NHS, whereas data and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we describe our empirical strategy which produces the results that are presented in Section 7. Finally, some concluding remarks are o¤ered in Section 8.
Related literature
Our paper relates primarily to the empirical literature on the impact of competition in hospital markets. 6 The evidence on the e¤ect of competition is mostly from the US and the UK, and has mixed …ndings. In the US, Kessler and McClellan (2000) …nd that AMI mortality is higher for Medicare patients in more concentrated markets. 7 They also …nd that hospitals in less concentrated areas have lower expenditures when Medicare introduced …xed (DRG) prices, and conclude that (non-price) competition among US hospitals is welfare improving. Shen (2003) …nds that competition (measured by the number of hospitals) interacted with the Medicare payment leads to lower AMI mortality for Medicare patients after 1990. In contrast, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) …nd that AMI and pneumonia mortality rates are higher for Medicare patients in less concentrated markets in the Los Angeles area. Mukamel et al. (2001) …nd no e¤ect of competition (measured by concentration) on overall hospital mortality for Medicare patients. A recent study by Colla et al. (2016) …nds that competition reduces AMI mortality, has no e¤ect on emergency readmissions for hip and knee replacement, and reduces quality for dementia patients in Medicare. 8 In England, Propper et al. (2004) and Burgess et al. (2008) …nd that more competition increased AMI mortality in the 1990s when the internal market was introduced and hospital prices were not …xed but negotiated with local health authorities. Burgess et al. (2008) , however, …nd that 6 There is also a large theoretical literature on hospital competition. Gaynor (2006) shows that pro…t-maximising hospitals respond to competition by improving quality of care when prices are …xed, while this e¤ect is generally ambiguous with endogenous prices. Brekke et al. (2011) show that the positive e¤ect of hospital competition on quality with …xed prices holds also for semi-altruistic hospitals unless the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently high. See also Brekke et al. (2010) for a study on quality competition with endogenous prices. 7 In a related paper, Kessler and Geppert (2005) …nd that the AMI mortality rate for high-risk Medicare patients is higher in concentrated markets, while there is no such e¤ect for low-risk patients. 8 There is also an interesting strand of literature on the interaction between information and competition in hospital markets. For example, Chou et al. (2014) …nd that report cards on the quality of providers reduced CABG mortality for more severely ill patients in more competitive areas. and Gaynor et al. (2013) . This approach deals with the endogeneity of market structure that possibly a¤ects the estimates in studies using cross-sectional variation in market concentration over time. Second, our study con…rms the external validity of the aforementioned estimated e¤ects of hospital competition by providing evidence from outside the US and England. Compared to the US, the institutional setting in the Norwegian NHS is very di¤erent along many dimensions, including ownership structure, use of market mechanisms, extent of endogenous versus …xed prices, etc. Compared to the English NHS, the institutional setting in the Norwegian NHS is also di¤erent along a few dimensions, including the level of the …xed prices, the ownership structure, and the geographic distribution of hospitals and patients. Despite low …xed (DRG) prices, public hospitals, and long travel distances, we still …nd positive e¤ects of competition on hospital quality and cost e¢ ciency, indicating a welfare improvement of the reorganisation of the delivery of health care. In the next section, we present mechanisms that might possibly explain these …ndings.
Theoretical framework
Suppose that there are two hospitals, denoted by subscripts i and j, in a given market for secondary health care. 9 Patients are fully insured against health expenses, so the demand for Hospital i, measured by number of treatments, is given by x i (q i ; q j ; ), where q k q is the quality of Hospital k = i; j. The lower bound on hospital quality represents the minimum treatment quality that hospitals are allowed to o¤er, implying that q < q can be interpreted as malpractice. We assume that x i is increasing in q i and decreasing in q j . The e¤ect of competition is captured by the parameter , which measures the degree of patient choice, implying that a higher value of represents a market with more competition. We assume that @x i =@ > (<) 0 if q i > (<) q j , and that @x i =@ = 0 if q i = q j . Thus, for a given distribution of qualities across hospitals, patient choice increases (reduces) demand for hospitals with higher (lower) quality. Furthermore, we assume that @ 2 x i =@ @q i > 0, implying that patient choice makes demand for each hospital more responsive to quality changes. This is, intuitively, the key e¤ect of competition in markets where the providers compete on quality.
The objective function of Hospital i is assumed to be given by
The hospital payment system is characterised by the contract (p; T ), where each hospital receives a …xed price p per treatment and a lump-sum payment T . Total treatment costs are given by a cost function c ( ) which depends on the total number of treatments (x i ), quality (q i ) and the amount of cost-containment e¤ort (e i ) exerted by the hospital. 10 We assume that, by spending more e¤ort on cost containment, the hospital can (i) reduce the total costs of a given treatment volume and quality provision (@c=@e i < 0), (ii) reduce the marginal cost of treatments (@ 2 c=@e i @x i < 0) for a given quality level and (iii) possibly also reduce the marginal cost of quality provision for a given treatment volume (@ 2 c=@e i @q i 0). The disutility of exerting cost-containment e¤ort is given by a strictly convex function g (e i ).
We also assume that the providers are semi-altruistic in the sense that patient utility is part of the hospitals'objectives. More speci…cally, we assume that the decision-makers at Hospital i to some extent take into account the total utility of patients treated at the hospital, given by B i ( ), which is increasing in x i and q i . The degree of altruism is captured by the parameter , implying that a purely pro…t-oriented hospital is characterised by = 0.
Suppose that the two hospitals play a non-cooperative game where they simultaneously choose quality and cost-containment e¤ort. The …rst-order conditions for Hospital i are given by
We consider a symmetric equilibrium with interior solutions, where q j = q i > q and e j = e i > 0.
The Nash equilibrium is then characterised by the following 2-equation system:
Competition and quality provision
From (4)- (5), we derive the following relationship between patient choice and equilibrium quality provision (see Appendix A for details):
An e¤ect (positive or negative) of competition on equilibrium quality provision requires that the equilibrium is an interior solution with q i > q. Thus, the condition in (6) needs to be seen in conjunction with the …rst-order condition for optimal quality provision, given by (2). 11 For this purpose, it is useful to re-write (2) as follows:
Comparing (6) and (7), we see that the sign of @q i =@ is given by the sign of the …rst term on the left-hand side of (7).
Consider …rst the special case of purely pro…t-oriented hospitals (i.e., = 0). It is evident from (7) that, if an interior solution exists, each hospital will choose a quality level that implies a positive price-cost margin (i.e., p @c=@x i > 0). This implies, from (6) , that @q i =@ > 0.
Because of continuity, this result holds also for su¢ ciently small values of . Thus, if the degree of altruism is su¢ ciently low, competition leads to higher quality. 12 The intuition behind this result is straightforward. If the marginal patient is pro…table to treat, a su¢ ciently pro…t-oriented hospital will react to competition (which implies a more quality-elastic demand) by increasing quality in order to attract more patients.
However, a su¢ ciently high degree of altruism might introduce a counteracting incentive. All else equal, altruism stimulates incentives for quality provision. This creates not only a larger scope for the existence of an interior-solution equilibrium, but it also creates a scope for an interior solution with a negative price-cost margin (i.e., p @c=@x i < 0). In this case, competition has two counteracting e¤ects on the incentives for quality provision. On the one hand, hospitals have an incentive to 'compete'to avoid treating unpro…table patients (since p @c=@x i < 0), implying lower quality. On the other hand, the presence of semi-altruistic preferences creates an incentive for 'altruistic competition' to treat more patients, implying higher quality. Overall, competition will lead to lower quality provision in equilibrium if the former e¤ect is stronger than the latter.
From (6)- (7) we see that the scope for a negative relationship between competition and quality (i.e., @q i =@ < 0) is larger if p is relatively low, and if @B i =@q i is large relative to @B i =@x i (i.e., if the hospitals care more about the quality o¤ered to patients than about the number of patients treated). 1 2 Alternatively, if an interior solution does not exist, i.e., if
for all qi q, each hospital will choose quality at the minimum level and (a marginal increase in) competition has no e¤ect on equilibrium quality provision.
Competition and cost e¢ ciency
The e¤ect of increased patient choice on equilibrium cost e¢ ciency is given by (once more, see Appendix A for details):
Thus, under the condition @F e =@q i > 0, competition leads to higher (lower) cost e¢ ciency if it also leads to higher (lower) quality provision. The condition @F e =@q i > 0 requires that either (i) higher quality provision leads to higher total demand for hospital treatment, i.e., @ (
(ii) more cost-containment e¤ort reduces the marginal cost of quality provision for a given treatment volume, i.e., @ 2 c=@e i @q i < 0.
If (i) holds, a positive relationship between competition and quality provision implies that competition also leads to a higher treatment volume at each hospital, which gives each hospital a stronger incentive to increase the pro…t margin by reducing marginal treatment costs. If (ii) holds, a positive relationship between competition and quality provision also gives each hospital a stronger incentive to reduce the marginal cost of quality provision through cost-containment e¤ort. Obviously, the logic is reversed for the case of a negative relationship between competition and quality provision. Thus, if (i) and/or (ii) hold, quality and cost-containment e¤orts are complementary strategies for each hospital. On the other hand, if total demand for hospital treatment is …xed and if it is not possible to reduce the marginal cost of quality provision through cost-containment e¤ort, then competition has no e¤ect on hospital cost e¢ ciency.
Institutional background and NHS reforms
Norway has a mandatory health insurance scheme provided by the government and …nanced through general taxation. Almost all health care is provided by the National Health Service (NHS) with only a very limited private provision alongside. Primary care is provided by publicly funded physicians, so-called general practitioners (GPs), that are gatekeepers, implying that patients need a referral to access secondary care. Secondary care is provided by NHS hospitals. During our analysis period from 1998 to 2005, we have in total 64 NHS hospitals with 58 being public and 6 private non-pro…t. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of the 64 hospitals in the Norwegian NHS, revealing substantial variation in the density of hospitals across the country, with highest (lowest) hospital density in South-Eastern (Northern) Norway.
[ Figure 1 here ]
The NHS hospitals are funded by a combination of block grants and …xed prices per patient (treatment). The block grant payment is a sort of capitation scheme (risk-adjusted …xed payment per inhabitant in each health region), whereas the …xed prices are based on the diagnosis related groups (DRG) system. The mixed funding scheme, which was introduced in 1997 in the Norwegian NHS, implies that the …xed DRG prices are cut according to the relative share of block grant and …xed price funding. During the analysis period, the share of the …xed DRG price funding ‡uctuates between 40 to 60 percent, as shown in Figure 2 . Thus, the NHS hospitals receive between 40 to 60 percent of the …xed treatment prices, which are set equal to the average cost across NHS hospitals within each DRG, during this period.
[ Following the patient choice reform, the public hospitals were corporatised into so-called stateowned health enterprises, and ownership was transferred from the counties to the state. The motivations behind this ownership reform, which was implemented in 2002, were mainly to enforce harder budgets and reduce the political in ‡uence on the governance of the public hospitals. The public hospitals were also given more …nancial autonomy, including the possibility of transferring surpluses (or de…cits) across years. Norway was also divided into …ve health regions, each with a regional health authority governing the provision hospital care within their region, which had previously been done by 19 county administrations prior to the reform. Thus, public hospitals were given more autonomy and …nancial ‡exibility, which could make them more responsive to patient choice, as gain (loss) of patients would increase (reduce) revenues. Notably, the reforms in the Since the data include patient and hospital identi…ers, we can compute travel distances and patient ‡ows by using a distance matrix containing information in terms of kilometers and travel time. All hospitals in our sample provide emergency treatments, leaving us with a sample of 64 hospitals of which 58 are public hospitals and 6 are private non-pro…t hospitals. However, for the analysis of AMI and stroke mortality, we exclude hospitals with very few patients in order to avoid the problem of variability of rates from small denominators, reducing our sample to 61 hospitals. The data are aggregated such that the unit of observation is at hospital level per quarter for mortality and hospital-DRG level per quarter for readmission and length of stay.
[ Table 1 here ] The average hospital in our sample has an overall mortality rate of 3 percent, AMI mortality rate of 14 percent, and stroke mortality rate of 13:1 percent. These are in-hospital mortality rates.
Unfortunately, information on post-hospital discharge mortality rates (e.g., 30 day AMI mortality rate) was not available during our sample period. However, most studies do …nd similar e¤ects for both in-hospital and after discharge mortality rates. 14 Finally, the Hirschman-Her…ndahl Index (HHI) for the average hospital in our sample indicates a fairly high degree of market concentration with actual and predicted HHIs at the levels of 4532 and 3707, respectively. The HHIs are based on patient ‡ows and computed using the approach by Kessler and McClellan (2000) , which we describe in detail in the next section.
To get a …rst glimpse of the possible e¤ects of exposing NHS hospitals in Norway to competition, we split hospitals according to whether they are above or below the median (predicted) HHI in the sample, and compare the change in the means of our dependent variables before and after the patient choice reform. The descriptive statistics of this decomposition are reported in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 here ]
The average travelling distance increases considerably more, both in absolute and relative terms, for patients being treated in hospitals with an HHI below the median. This indicates that patient choice is exercised to a larger extent in less concentrated markets, and is therefore a reassuring indication of the validity of using the HHI as measure of the scope for competition, as we explain more elaborately in Section 6.
Regarding changes in our dependent variables, Table 2 shows that hospitals with an HHI below the median tend to have a sharper reduction in mortality rates than hospitals with an HHI above the median. This tendency is consistent across all three mortality measures. A similar picture emerges for the length of stay for elective admissions, where the reduction is larger for hospitals with an HHI below the median. For readmission rates, on the other hand, the opposite tendency occurs, with relatively stronger reductions for hospitals with and HHI above the median, making the overall picture somewhat mixed. It remains to be seen, though, whether it is possible to establish any causal relationships. This is explored in the next section, where we explain our empirical strategy to identify the e¤ects of exposing NHS hospitals to (non-price) competition, and report the results from our estimations.
Empirical strategy
To estimate the e¤ects of competition on hospitals' provision of care, we exploit a policy reform Based on the theoretical analysis in Section 3, we predict that the introduction of (or simply harder) non-price competition induces hospitals to improve their quality of care if they are su¢ -ciently pro…t oriented and face a positive price-cost margin (i.e., the regulated DRG price exceeds the marginal cost). However, if hospitals are su¢ ciently patient utility oriented (altruistic), the e¤ect of competition is generally ambiguous. Indeed, in the case of a negative price-cost margin, the introduction of competition may have adverse e¤ects on hospitals'incentives to improve quality of care. We also identify a positive relationship between quality and cost-containment e¤ort, implying that the e¤ect of competition on hospitals' cost e¢ ciency is qualitatively similar to the e¤ect on quality. The predictions from the theoretical analysis in Section 3 can therefore be summarised as in Table 3 .
[ Table 3 here ]
The majority of hospitals in the Norwegian NHS have public ownership, which makes it less obvious that pro…t maximisation is their key objective. Moreover, the mixed hospital payment scheme with partly block grant funding implies a signi…cant cut in the DRG prices (around 50 We apply a DiD approach to estimate the e¤ect of competition on hospitals' care provision, where the intensity of the treatment is captured by the interaction of the predicted pre-reform HHIs (speci…c for each hospital) and a post-reform dummy (common to all hospitals). The predicted pre-reform HHIs are treatment intensity measures, re ‡ecting the level of competition each hospital is facing after the reform. We estimate the following DiD regression model
where h denotes the hospital, d the DRG and t the quarter. Y hdt is the dependent variable of interest, which is either readmission rates, mortality rates (AMI, stroke, and overall), or length of stay. All the outcomes variables are log-transformed. D t is a post-reform dummy taking the value 1 for all periods after the reform was implemented in January 2001 and 0 otherwise. HHI h is the logarithm of the predicted pre-reform HHIs speci…c for each hospital. We interact this concentration measure with the post-reform dummy. Thus, is the DiD coe¢ cient capturing the e¤ect of introducing competition among the NHS hospitals and can be interpreted as an elasticity.
In the regression, we also include hospital-DRG …xed e¤ects ( hd ) that control for hospital and treatment speci…c unobserved heterogeneity which are invariant over time. This implies that the e¤ects of competition are estimated using only within hospital and DRG variation over time in our outcome variables. For overall mortality, we include only hospital …xed e¤ects due to very low (often zero) mortality rates for many of the DRGs. For AMI and stroke mortality, we exclude hospitals that treat less than three patients in each quarter. The regression model also includes time dummies ( t ), one for each quarter in each year, to control for time trends in our outcome variables, and a vector of observed characteristics (X hdt ) of each hospital's patient population over time (average age, proportion of male patients and comorbidity at DRG level) to control for patient casemix. Finally, " hdt is random noise.
Results
In this section we report the results from our empirical analysis on the impact of hospital quality and cost e¢ ciency. Towards the end of the section, we also report results on whether hospital ownership matters by exploring di¤erential e¤ects of competition on public and private (non-pro…t) hospitals.
Hospital quality
Hospital quality is measured by both mortality and readmission rates, where a reduction in mortality and readmission rates indicates higher quality. For mortality, we use mortality rates for AMI and stroke, which are acute illnesses with a non-negligible chance of death, as well as overall mortality rates. While mortality rates are measured at the hospital level, readmissions are measured at the hospital-DRG level, as explained above. We also estimate the e¤ects on readmission rates separately for acute and elective treatments. The former is less exposed to endogeneity issues related to changes in the patient population induced by the patient choice reform. This is also a main argument for focusing on AMI and stroke mortality.
[ Table 4 here ] Table 4 reports our DiD estimates of the impact of exposing NHS hospitals to competition on hospital quality measured by (in-hospital) mortality rates. The estimates control for time trends, patient population characteristics, and hospital …xed e¤ects. The …rst column presents the estimates for stroke mortality, the second for AMI mortality, and the third for overall hospital mortality.
While the point estimates of the DiD coe¢ cients are positive for all three mortality measures, the e¤ect is statistically signi…cant (at 1% level) only for AMI mortality. The DiD coe¢ cient implies that a 10 percent fall (i.e., a 370 points reduction from the mean) in the predicted HHI is associated with a 2.82 percent fall in the AMI mortality. This amounts to a reduction of 0.39 percentage points at the mean AMI mortality rate of 14 percent in the sample. In other words, a 10 percent fall in the HHI implies that one additional life is saved per 500 AMI admissions. in the HHI leads to a 2.91 percent drop in the AMI mortality rate, which is very close to our estimate. 15 This is perhaps surprising, since the institutional di¤erences suggest that incentives for competition in the Norwegian NHS might be weaker than in the English NHS, because of the mixed payment scheme (implying a lower DRG price) and generally longer travel distances. When considering all three mortality measures, we do not …nd any adverse quality e¤ects of exposing the NHS hospitals to competition.
According to our theoretical analysis, the above described …ndings indicate either that the Norwegian hospitals are pro…t-oriented and face non-negative price-cost margins, or, if price-cost margins are negative, that the hospitals'altruistic incentives to compete for patients are not outweighed by their …nancial incentives to avoid attracting patients that are unpro…table to treat.
[ Table 5 here ] Table 5 reports our DiD estimates of the e¤ect of competition on hospital readmission rates.
The estimates control for time trends, patient population characteristics, and hospital-DRG …xed e¤ects. The …rst column presents the estimates for readmissions for elective treatments, whereas the second column presents the estimates for emergency treatments, which are less likely to be prone to selection issues due to changes in patient ‡ows after the policy reform.
Contrary to what is suggested by the descriptive statistics in Table 2 , the DiD coe¢ cients indicate a positive and signi…cant e¤ect of market concentration on both emergency and elective readmission rates, though the magnitude of the e¤ect di¤ers between the two measures. The estimated coe¢ cients imply that a 10 percent fall in a hospital's predicted HHI on average results in a 7.8 (1.3) percent fall in the emergency (elective) readmission rate. At the sample average these changes correspond to a 1.3 (0.2) percentage point reduction in the emergency (elective) readmission rates. Put di¤erently, a 10 percent fall in the HHI leads to one less readmission per 77 (500) emergency (elective) admissions. These …ndings indicate that exposing the NHS hospitals to (stronger) competition reduces the underlying risk of being readmitted, which is an indicator of better hospital quality. Unlike the case of AMI mortality, the e¤ects on readmission rates are identi…ed by variation within hospital and DRG.
Hospital cost e¢ ciency
We also examine whether the pro-competition reform had any impact on hospital cost e¢ ciency measured by mean length of stay. While competition may not have a direct impact on incentives to expend e¤ort on reducing treatment costs, there may be indirect e¤ects through the impact of competition on quality, as described in Section 3. In particular, the incentive to improve cost e¢ ciency and thus the pro…t margin is increasing in a hospital's demand, which implies that quality and cost-containment incentives are complementary strategies. Thus, to the extent that competition induces higher quality and in turn demand, we expect to …nd a negative e¤ect on (mean) length of stay.
[ Table 6 here ] Table 6 reports our DiD estimates of the e¤ect of competition on hospital cost e¢ ciency measured by mean length of stay. The estimates control for time trends, patient population characteristics, and hospital-DRG …xed e¤ects. The …rst column presents the estimates for mean length of stay for elective treatments, whereas the second column presents the estimates for mean length of stay for emergency treatments, which are less likely to be endogenous due to changes in patient ‡ows after the reform. The DiD coe¢ cients are positive and signi…cant for both elective and emergency treatments, with the e¤ect being markedly stronger for elective treatments. The estimates imply that a 10 percent fall in the HHI on average results in a 0.4 (1.6) percent fall in the mean length of stay for emergency (elective) treatments. At the mean length of stay in the sample of 5.9 (5.2) days for emergency (elective) treatments, this implies that one in every 46 (12) patients in these respective categories is discharged one day earlier.
Public versus private hospital ownership
Finally, we examine whether hospital ownership matters for the e¤ects of the pro-competition reform in the Norwegian NHS. In particular, we analyse whether private (non-pro…t) hospitals in the NHS respond di¤erently to competition than their public counterparts. There are only six private non-pro…t hospitals in the NHS in the period, so the results need to be interpreted with some caution. To analyse the potential ownership e¤ect, we estimate the following regression model:
where P h is a dummy variable taking value one if the hospital is private and zero otherwise (it is equal to one in 9,983 observations). 16 is the coe¢ cient capturing the di¤erential ownership e¤ect of exposing hospitals to competition, where the ownership dummy is interacted with the reform dummy and the pre-reform HHIs for each hospital. The results from these estimations are presented in Table 7 , where the estimates of the key coe¢ cients with respect to mortality, readmission and length of stay are displayed in Panels A, B and C, respectively.
[ Table 7 here ]
The only dimension along which hospital ownership clearly seems to make a signi…cant di¤erence is cost e¢ ciency. Although increased competition leads to a signi…cant reduction in the average length of stay for the whole population of hospitals, the e¤ect is considerably stronger for private hospitals, and this di¤erence is statistically highly signi…cant for both elective and emergency admissions. In fact, for the latter type of admission, the overall e¤ect of competition, which is admittedly quite low, seems to be largely driven by the response of the private hospitals.
For the other variables where we …nd signi…cant e¤ects in our main analysis, namely AMI mortality and (elective and emergency) readmissions, private hospitals do not seem to respond signi…cantly di¤erent from the public hospitals, though the point estimates have a positive sign.
Overall, our results indicate that both public and private (non-pro…t) hospitals respond to competition by improving quality and cost e¢ ciency, with the private hospitals being more responsive with respect to cost e¢ ciency. According to our theoretical analysis, this can be explained by stronger pro…t motivation and/or higher price-cost margins.
Concluding remarks
We have studied the impact of introducing (non-price) competition among hospitals in the NHS on the provision of care. Our empirical analysis exploits a policy reform that implemented nationwide The results show that hospitals in more competitive areas have a signi…cantly sharper reduction in AMI mortality rates, readmission rates, and length of stay than hospitals in less competitive areas after the policy reform. The estimates for stroke and overall hospital mortality have the same sign as the estimate for AMI mortality, but these estimates are not statistically signi…cant. We also …nd some evidence that the private non-pro…t hospitals within the NHS respond more strongly to competition with respect to cost e¢ ciency. These …ndings are rationalised in a theoretical model where competition, induced by patient choice, has a generally ambiguous e¤ect, but is more likely to have a positive impact on quality and cost e¢ ciency if hospitals are pro…t motivated and face a positive price-cost margin. It is therefore noteworthy that we …nd a pro-competitive e¤ect in the Norwegian NHS, where hospitals are mainly public and the regulated DRG prices are low due to a mixed funding scheme. Indeed, our results are consistent with …ndings from a similar reform in the English NHS, and the e¤ects are also comparable in magnitude, even if the Norwegian health care system is characterised by lower DRG prices and generally longer travel distances.
While these …ndings indicate that exposing NHS hospitals to (non-price) competition (through patient choice) saves lives, reduces readmissions, and shortens hospital stays, we would like to stress some limitations of our study. First, while our …ndings point in the direction that competition is welfare improving, we have not performed a full welfare analysis, which would require detailed information about hospital costs and other factors a¤ecting patient utility, such as health bene…ts and waiting time. Second, we have only data on in-hospital mortality rates, whereas other studies also have information on mortality rates after hospital discharge (usually 30 days). If hospitals discharge patients in a poorer state when being exposed to competition, improvements in in-hospital mortality rates may be arti…cially driven by the fact that patients die after being discharged. While we cannot rule out this possibility, there are a several observations that go in the opposite direction, including the reduction in readmissions (complications). Moreover, there are no explicit incentives for hospitals to manipulate their in-hospital mortality rates as a response to competition, since monitoring and rankings in Norway are based on post-hospital (30 days) discharge mortality rates.
Importantly, studies that have both in-hospital and post-hospital mortality rates tend to …nd similar (not opposite) e¤ects of competition on the two measures. Third, our distance measures are based on municipality of residence, and thus more crude than the ones used in the studies from England (de…ned neighbourhoods) and the US (zip-codes). However, the municipality structure in Norway is highly decentralised, except in some urban areas. Moreover, the geographical distribution of patients and hospitals is such that the majority of patient ‡ows are across rather than within municipalities.
) a¤ects equilibrium quality provision and cost e¢ ciency. Di¤erentiation of (4) 
and
The symmetry assumption has two implications that that are important for the derivation of (A2)-(A5). First, when both hospitals provide the same quality level, patient choice has no direct e¤ect on demand; i.e., @x i =@ = 0. Second, notice that
Applying Cramer's Rule on (A1), the e¤ect of competition on equilibrium quality provision is
given by
Since > 0, @F e =@e i < 0 and @F e =@ = 0, we have
Using (A4), we derive the condition given by (6) in Section 3.
Applying once more Cramer's Rule to (A1), the e¤ect of competition on equilibrium cost-containment e¤ ort is given by
Since > 0 and @F e =@ = 0, we have
which implies the condition given by (8) in Section 3.
B. Estimation of the hospital concentration measures
To derive the predicted HHIs for each hospital, we …rst estimate the probability that Patient i chooses Hospital h out of a total of H hospitals using the following conditional logit model at individual patient level
where km ih is the distance in kilometers from Patient i's municipality of residence to the municipality where Hospital h is located. We also include the interactions between distance measures and a vector of patient characteristics (age and gender) denoted by X i . In order to control for the size of the hospitals, we include hospital …xed e¤ects a h .
Because of the geographic and demographic characteristics of Norway, which is sparsely populated over a long-stretched area, travelling distances can potentially be very long. In such a setting, a potential concern when estimating (B1) is that the model will attribute an unreasonably high probability to choosing a hospital that is located very far away. We therefore restrict the choice set of each patient to the six closest hospitals (and drop observations of patients that are treated by hospitals outside this set). 17 The estimates are derived using data from 1998, which is our …rst year of observation prior to the patient choice reform. Some descriptive statistics regarding the geographical patterns of hospital treatment are presented in Table B1 . The …gures displayed in this table reveal that average travelling distances in the Norwegian hospital market are considerably longer than those in the otherwise comparable UK studies. The table also con…rms that the vast majority (more than 90 percent) of the patients were treated at hospitals within our de…ned choice set.
[ Table B1 here]
Based on the predicted individual patient choice probabilities, we compute the hospital-speci…c
HHIs following the same two-step procedure as in Cooper et al. (2011) and Gaynor et al. (2013) .
First, the HHI in each municipality is calculated as the sum of squared patient shares across all hospitals where the residents in the municipality migrates to for all elective care. 18 Second, the HHI for each hospital is calculated as a weighted average of the HHIs for the municipalities served by the hospital, where the weights are the shares of the hospital's patients that live in each municipality.
[ Figure B1 here ] Figure B1 displays the kernel densities for the predicted HHIs (based on patient ‡ow data from 1998) and the actual HHIs (based on patient ‡ow data from 1998 to 2005). 19 The predicted HHIs 
